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Abstract

In the last decade, blockchain has emerged as one of the most influential innovations in software architecture
and technology. Ideally, blockchains are designed to be architecturally and politically decentralized, similar
to the Internet. But recently, public and permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have faced
stumbling blocks in the form of scalability. Both Bitcoin and Ethereum process fewer than 20 transactions
per second, which is significantly lower than their centralized counterpart such as VISA that can process
approximately 1,700 transactions per second. In realizing this hindrance in the wide range adoption of
blockchains for building advanced and large scalable systems, the blockchain community has proposed firstand second-layer scaling solutions including Segregated Witness (Segwit), Sharding, and two-way pegged
sidechains. Although these proposals are innovative, they still suffer from the blockchain trilemma of
scalability, security, and decentralization. Moreover, at this time, little is known or discussed regarding
factors related to design choices, feasibility, limitations and other issues in adopting the various first- and
second-layer scaling solutions in public and permissionless blockchains. Hence, this thesis provides the first
comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art first- and second-layer scaling solutions for public and
permissionless blockchains, identifying current advancements and analyzing their impact from various
viewpoints, highlighting their limitations and discussing possible remedies for the overall improvement of
the blockchain domain.
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Chapter 1.

Introduction

In the last decade, blockchain has emerged as one of the most influential innovations in software
architecture and technology. Ideally, public blockchains (such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and
Ethereum (Wood, 2014)) are designed to be architecturally and politically decentralized (Robinson,
2018), similar to the Internet. They enable trusted transactions among several untrusted participants
on a network without a need for a trusted central authority or a third party. As a result of this,
blockchains are now employed in various computing and business domains such as cloud
computing, supply-chains, Internet of Things (IoT), finance, and many others (Miller, 2018),
(Fiaidhi, Mohammed, & Mohammed, 2018), (Zhou, Wang, Sun, & Lv, 2018), (Mylrea &
Gourisetti, 2018). Alongside its industrial counterpart, academic research in the domain is also
increasing rapidly, especially in applying blockchain technology for developing decentralized
solutions and applications (S. Yu et al., 2018), (Lou, Zhang, Qi, & Lei, 2018), (Kan et al., 2018),
(Robinson, 2018). Additionally, research in recognizing technical challenges in the blockchain
domain (Reza M Parizi, Amritraj, & Dehghantanha, 2018), (Atzei, Bartoletti, & Cimoli, 2017),
(Giaglis et al., 2017) has also been growing steadily in the recent years along with studies that
provide possible solutions to these challenges including, formal verification of smart contracts
(Bhargavan et al., 2016), (Amani, Bégel, Bortin, & Staples, 2018), (Abdellatif & Brousmiche,
2018), scalability improvement of blockchains (Dennis, Owenson, & Aziz, 2016) and defining
atomic cross-chain swap protocols (Herlihy, 2018).

1.1

The Problem

This growth in interest from both the enterprise and research communities in blockchain related
technologies has seen a major stumbling block in recent years in the form of scalability, which has
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quickly become the core problem surrounding blockchains. Scalability of a system or network is
defined as its capacity to grow in size and manage increased demand from its user-base (Duboc,
Rosenblum, & Wicks, 2006). In other words, scalable systems can be efficiently enlarged to
accommodate increased usage and activity from their user-base.
State-of-the-art blockchains are hindered by scalability due to the following two reasons:
1) There are limits on the number of transactions that a blockchain network can process and 2)
blockchains are designed to provide solutions to a specific problem, they often tend to be vanilla in
nature and hence, generally lack many features that traditional state-of-the-art centralized systems
offer out of the box. For instance, a centralized database system can be built to provide several
functionalities at once such as supply chain tracking, financial payments, and remote shopping,
whereas on the other hand, a blockchain such as Bitcoin is built to provide only one functionality,
i.e. to facilitate trustless peer-to-peer financial transactions within its network. Hence, it cannot
store supply-chain information or provide the comforts of remote shopping to a user on its network
by itself. In fact, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to implement a universal blockchain that
could solve all problems with the current technology.

Figure 1: The Blockchain Trilemma
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State-of-the-art blockchains face a trilemma of scalability, security, and decentralization (Figure
1). Blockchains can only have two of these three attributes:
•

Scalability concerns with the ability of a blockchain to process transactions in bulk. If
public blockchains are to become mainstream, then they need to be able to handle the
scenario in which there are millions of users on the network.

•

Security is concerned with the immutability of the blockchain and its robustness to attacks
such as Sybil (Douceur, 2002), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) (Feinstein,
Schnackenberg, Balupari, & Kindred, 2003) and 51% attacks1.

•

Decentralization is the core tenant upon which the blockchain community is built upon
which provides censorship resistance and allows any user to participate in a decentralized
environment without prejudice.
Public and permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum were designed around

decentralization and security as core features. However, this came at an expense of scalability as
both Bitcoin and Ethereum have extremely low throughput when it comes to transaction processing
rates. For instance, Bitcoin can only process approximately 7 transactions per second 2 and
Ethereum can process approximately 15 transactions per second 3 . When compared to their
centralized counterparts such as VISA which can process approximately 1,700 transactions per
second4, these public blockchains do not post impressive numbers.

1

https://medium.com/chainrift-research/bitcoins-attack-vectors-51-attacks-a96deac43774
https://blockexplorer.com/blocks
3 https://etherscan.io/
4 https://altcointoday.com/bitcoin-ethereum-vs-visa-paypal-transactions-per-second/
2
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1.2

Solutions Proposed by the Community

Realizing this hindrance in the growth and further adoption of blockchains for building advanced
and complicated software systems, both the research and enterprise communities have proposed
first- and second-layer scaling solutions for blockchains.

1.2.1

First-layer Scaling Solutions

First-layer scaling solutions are the ones that require changes to the source code of a blockchain
(Dolce, 2018). These solutions propose enhancements to the core characteristics and features of a
blockchain. Some examples of first layer solutions include increasing the block size limit of Bitcoin
from 1MB to 10 MB or reducing the block creation time from 10 minutes to 5 minutes. Some other
ways in which first layer scaling solutions could be implemented are as follows:

•

Segregated witness: Segregated Witness (Dolce, 2018) is a proposed first-layer scaling
solution for the Bitcoin protocol that changes the way data is stored on the Bitcoin
blockchain. The proposal is to remove the signature data from each transaction of a block
to free up space for more transactions to be included in Bitcoin’s current 1 Megabyte block
size. In its current implementation the signature data in Bitcoin takes up almost 70% of the
block space which leaves behind little space for transactions. Therefore, removing it would
save tremendous space that allows more transactions to be included in the block.

•

Sharding: Sharding (Dolce, 2018) proposes the breaking down or dividing blockchains
into smaller manageable parts called shards, that run simultaneous (parallel) to one
another. Each shard is in-charge of processing transactions within the group, thereby
increasing processing output across the board. Fragmenting the network into many
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different small parts allow the Ethereum blockchain to function as the sum of its parts,
rather than being limited by the speed of each individual node.

1.2.2

Second-layer Scaling Solutions

Second-layer scaling solutions are the ones that propose the implementation of secondary protocols
on top a pre-existing primary blockchain called the primary chain or the mainchain (Dolce, 2018).
This reduces network congestion and saves space as the transactions are off-loaded onto the
secondary protocols. Second-layer solutions involve the proposal of sidechains:
•

Sidechains: are secondary blockchains which are connected to other blockchains by means
of a two-way peg. A two-way peg is a mechanism that allows the bidirectional transfer of
assets between the main chain and the sidechain at a fixed or pre-deterministic exchange
rate. Sidechains may have their own protocol and implementation which can be completely
different from the main blockchain. Such adjustability provides users of a network with the
flexibility to access various other functionalities and features offered on a sidechain by
using the assets they already own on the main blockchain. Furthermore, sidechains are
isolated from the main blockchain in such a way that in the case of a cryptographic break
(or a maliciously designed sidechain), the damage is entirely confined to the sidechain
itself.

1.3

Contributions of this Work

Although promising, the existing scaling solutions are still in the state of infancy and to this date,
little is known or discussed regarding factors related to design choices, feasibility, limitations and
other issues in adopting these scaling solutions. Moreover, there is a lack of comparative and

11
empirical studies both in academic and industrial environments to analyze such protocols and multiblockchain systems in a comprehensive manner. Hence, the motivation of this research is to provide
the first comprehensive analysis of the first- and second-layer scaling solutions for public and
permissionless blockchains to understand the design choices, advancements, use cases, and
limitations of such solutions. The specific contributions of this research are as follows:
•

Provide a thorough analysis of first and second-layer blockchain scaling solutions.

•

Analyze the most common design choices for these scaling solutions by highlighting their
advantages and disadvantages

•

Provide a comprehensive review of current state-of-the-art scalability enhancing platforms
based on their use cases, consensus mechanisms, asset transfer protocol and limitations
with horizontal comparison

•

Provide an overview of new and upcoming innovative scaling solutions and frameworks

•

Identify open issues and discuss possible solutions to mitigate those issues with state-ofthe-art blockchain scaling solutions

The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes the research protocol and
methodology used and the research questions answered by this work. Chapter 3 investigates the
first layer scaling solutions and answers the research questions raised for such proposals. Chapter
4 discusses the second layer scaling solutions and answers the research questions raised for such
solutions. Chapter 5 sheds light on open issues and limitations while proposing future directions
and possible solutions to mitigate these issues and limitations. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the
conclusion of this work.
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Chapter 2.

Research Methodology

In this work, we analyze the state-of-the-art first- and second-layer scaling solutions and platforms
proposed for improving the scalability of public and permissionless blockchains including Bitcoin
and Ethereum. For this work, we adopted an Systematic Literature Review (SLR) based
information and data gathering approach which helped us in identification, evaluation and
interpretation of all available research, solutions or platforms relevant to one or more research
questions which are mentioned below (Kitchenham, 2004), (Kitchenham & Charters, 2007). Based
on these research questions (RQs) (see section 2.2) we designed a custom data gathering protocol
for the identification of relevant resources and platforms for this research.

2.1

Research Protocol

An important characteristic of every research work is the identification of a problem and a protocol
to solve that problem. Figure 3 outlines the protocol for the completion of this thesis.
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Figure 2: Thesis Protocol

It can be seen from the figure that our work started with the identification of a problem (in this
case, scalability of public and permissionless blockchains), which led us into raising research
questions regarding the state-of-the-art solutions. We then collected, filtered and expanded our
inclusion criteria to include all relevant research resources and proceeded to answer the raised
research questions which allowed us to identify open issues and ultimately, propose initial steps to
solve or mitigate these issues. In the following sections of this chapter, we will enlist the research
question raised and our data gathering strategy to answer these questions.
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2.2

Research Questions (RQs)

The most compelling motivation behind this research is to answer the following research questions
(RQs) based on the proposed first- and second-layer scaling solutions and platforms.

2.2.1
•

First Layer Scaling Solutions Research Questions (RQs)

RQ1: What are the Design Choices available for implementing first layer scaling
solutions?

•

RQ2: What are the limitations of these designs?

•

RQ3: What are the problems associated with implementing First Layer scalability
solutions in public blockchains?

2.2.2

Second Layer Scaling Solutions Research Questions (RQs)

•

RQ1: What are the available design choices for implementing two-way pegs?

•

RQ2: What are the advantages and limitations of these design choices?

•

RQ3: Which state-of-the-art platforms are implementing sidechains?
➢ RQ3a: What are the use cases of these platforms?
➢ RQ3b: How does asset transfer take place on these platforms?
➢ RQ3c: What consensus mechanism do these platforms utilize?
➢ RQ3d: How do these platforms impact the scalability of their mainchain?
➢ RQ3e: What are the limitations of these platforms?

To answer these questions, we designed a custom protocol to search and identify all relevant
resources such as journal articles, conference papers, workshop articles, etc. in the realms of
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blockchain scalability. In the subsequent sections, we describe the various steps that we performed
for filtering the relevant resources to accurately answer the research questions in this section.

2.3

Search Strategy

Once we determined the digital libraries and search engines to be used for gathering relevant
resources, we constructed several search terms to be used on these libraries and search engines
based on our research questions. Some examples of our search terms are mentioned in Table 1.
Table 1: Search string and terms

Terms
Search Terms
Used

Blockchain, Scalability, Sharding, Segregated witness,
Sidechains, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin, interoperability,
Ethereum, etc.
Ethereum Sharding, Bitcoin scalability, Blockchain
Scalability, smart contracts scalability, blockchain
interoperability, etc.

Figure 3: Initial filtering of the relevant works
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Next, we performed manual searches with several combinations of search terms on digital libraries
and search engines such as Google, Duck-Duck Go and Yahoo which yielded the results as shown
in Figure 2. This provided us with the unfiltered preliminary set of works on blockchain scalability.

2.4

Preliminary set of works

As mentioned in the previous section, we conducted manual searches based on search terms and
keywords on several identified digital libraries and search engines to identify and collect the
preliminary set of works. The results from these searches are summarized in Figure 2, which shows
the total number of preliminary studies acquired from each database and search engine. We
obtained a total of 2136 preliminary studies from our search. These studies were carefully chosen
based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria mentioned in Table 2.
Table 2: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for relevant works

Inclusion Criteria
Be published online digital databases such as
IEEE, ACM Digital Library, SpringerLink, etc.
Studies are in the domain of blockchain
scalability
Studies offer technical quality in the
presentation of ideas and reviews
Studies used current technical quality aspects

Exclusion criteria
Resources not published in English
Resources from unreliable online sources
Studies with poor presentation quality
Grey literature, studies with incomplete
ideas and poor explanation of concepts

Out of these 2136 studies, only 1047 were from online digital databases namely ScienceDirect,
IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, SpringerLink, John Wiley, Taylor and Forensic, Word
Scientific and Google Scholar. The remaining 1089 resources were from search engine results such
as Google, Yahoo and Duck-Duck Go. It is important to mention at this time the results obtained
in the search engines were considerably larger than just 1089 studies but, most of these results
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covered repetitive topics or were not from trustworthy sources. Hence, after we collected the 2136
preliminary set of works, we started the initial filtering phase where, the collected studies were
carefully removed based on duplicate removal, title filtering, and abstract filtering. The studies
remaining after each filtering stage is shown in Figure 2.
Table 3: Search results from digital databases
Digital
Database

Year

Article Name

arxiv

2018

Requirements for private Ethereum Sidechains

IEEE

2018

The Blockchain for Domain Based Static Sharding

IEEE

2018

A Scale-Out Blockchain for Value Transfer with
Spontaneous Sharding

IEEE

2018

OmniLedger: A Secure, Scale-Out, Decentralized
Ledger via Sharding

IEEE

2018

A Scalable and Extensible Blockchain Architecture

IEEE

2018

Challenges and Pitfalls of Partitioning Blockchains

IEEE

2018

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Shard-Based
Permissionless Blockchains
A Prototype Evaluation of a Tamper-Resistant
High Performance Blockchain-Based Transaction
Log for a Distributed Database
Chameleon: A Scalable and Adaptive Permissioned
Blockchain Architecture

IEEE

2017

IEEE

2018

IEEE

2018

Blockchain and Scalability

IEEE

2018

ProductChain: Scalable Blockchain Framework to
Support Provenance in Supply Chains

ACM Digital
Library

2016

A Secure Sharding Protocol For Open Blockchains

ACM Digital
Library

2016

Bringing Secure Bitcoin Transactions to Your
Smartphone

Reference
(Robinson,
2018)
(Yoo, Yim, &
Kim, 2018)
(Ren et al.,
2018)
(KokorisKogias et al.,
2018)
(Y. Yu, Liang,
& Xu, 2018)
(Fynn &
Pedone, 2018)
(Manshaei,
Jadliwala,
Maiti, &
Fooladgar,
2018)
(Aniello et al.,
2017)
(He, Su, &
Gao, 2018)
(Chauhan,
Malviya,
Verma, &
Mor, 2018)
(Malik,
Kanhere, &
Jurdak, 2018)
(Luu et al.,
2016)
(Frey,
Makkes,
Roman,
Ta\"\iani, &
Voulgaris,
2016)
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ACM Digital
Library

2018

RapidChain: Scaling Blockchain via Full Sharding

ACM Digital
Library

2018

Towards Solving the Data Availability Problem for
Sharded Ethereum

ACM Digital
Library

2016

Bringing Secure Bitcoin Transactions to Your
Smartphone

SpringerLink

2018

Pruneable sharding-based blockchain protocol

SpringerLink

2017

Short Paper: Service-Oriented Sharding for
Blockchains

SpringerLink

2018

A Decentralized Sharding Service Network
Framework with Scalability

SpringerLink

2016

On scaling decentralized blockchains

(Zamani,
Movahedi, &
Raykova,
2018)
(Sel, Zhang,
& Jacobsen,
2018)
(Frey et al.,
2016)
(Feng et al.,
2018)
(Gencer, van
Renesse, &
Sirer, 2017)
(Cai, Yang, &
Ming, 2018)
(Croman et
al., 2016)

The initial filtering stages reduced the relevant works to just 20 studies. These studies are shown in
Table 3. The next step in the filtering process was content filtering, where we removed studies with
irrelevant content in regard to this research by carefully and thoroughly reading each of the 20
studies. This process further reduced the relevant studies into single digits. This research focuses
on public and permissionless blockchain such as Ethereum and Bitcoin’s scalability and most of
the 20 preliminary studies fell out of the scope of this study as they focus on the scalability of
private or permissioned blockchains.
At this stage, we were forced to turn our attention towards the enterprise blockchain
community and other online resources published by credible sources and individuals such as
CoinDesk, Vitalik Buterin, and other well-established platforms such as the Lightening Network5
for Bitcoin, etc. Hence, we have answered our research questions based on the results of our
thorough investigation and analysis of both resources from online digital databases and other

5

https://lbtc.io/
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credible technical sources including but not limited to white papers, conference presentations,
technical talks, etc.
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Chapter 3.

First Layer Scaling Solutions

First layer scaling solutions are referred to as the scaling solutions that require changes to be made
onto the codebase of the blockchain. This entails enhancing the core features and characteristics of
the blockchain. Some examples of first layer solutions include increasing the block size limit of
Bitcoin from 1MB to 10 MB or reducing the block creation time from 10 minutes to 5 minutes.
In this chapter, we are going to discuss the two major First layer scaling solutions 1)
Segregated Witness, as proposed for the Bitcoin blockchain and 2) Sharding, which is proposed for
the Ethereum blockchain.

3.1

Segregated Witness

Segregated witness is a protocol upgrade for Bitcoin that changes the way and structure of how
data is stored. By removing the signature data for each transaction, it frees up more space and
capacity for more transactions to be stored in Bitcoin’s 1MB-capacity blocks. The signature data –
the digital signature that verifies the ownership and availability of the sender’s funds – make up
almost 70% of the entire space of a transaction. Therefore, removing it would save tremendous
space that allows more transactions to be included in the block (Dolce, 2018).

3.2

Sharding

At the time of writing this thesis, Ethereum, the most prominent smart contract platform in the
world, can only process approximately 15 transactions per second. This severe limitation, coupled
with the popularity of the platform, leads to high gas prices (the cost of executing a transaction on
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the network) and long confirmation times. Although a new block is added every 10-20 seconds on
Ethereum blockchain, the average time for a transaction to be added on to the blockchain is over 1
minute, according to ETH Gas Station6. Thus, low throughput, high gas prices, and high latency
have rendered Ethereum unsuitable for building scalable services and applications.
Ethereum’s low throughput is based on the fact that each node on the network has to
process each transaction that occurs on the platform. To address this limitation, the blockchain
community has proposed a few solutions which target the Ethereum protocol. Most of these
solutions introduce central entities to process transactions at a high frequency. This is usually done
by delegating all the computation to a small subset of powerful nodes. For instance, Thunder 7 runs
a single node to process all transactions and claims to achieve approximately 1200 transaction per
second which is 100 times faster than current Ethereum capabilities. Other examples of such
solutions are Algorand 8 , SpaceMesh 9 , and Solana 10 who are all attempting to improve the
consensus protocols and design of blockchains to process high volumes of transactions each
second. In addition to decentralization, another limitation of these solutions is that they are all
bounded by the processing capabilities of a single node and hence, are vulnerable to a complete
shutdown in case of power failures, natural disasters, etc.
In contrast, the other proposed solution, Blockchain sharding, delegates work such that,
each node on the network only performs a subset of the total amount of work in processing a
transaction on the blockchain. Sharding is the solution being used by the Ethereum foundation for
improving the scalability of the Ethereum platform.
The concept of sharding in the domain blockchains comes from the world of databases
where it is used to make servers and databases more efficient. This is done by storing each shard

6

https://ethgasstation.info/
https://www.thundercore.com/
8 https://www.algorand.com/
9 https://spacemesh.io/
10 https://solana.com/
7
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which a horizontal chunk of a database on a separate server instance consequently, spreading the
load on the server.
In blockchains, the idea is to have each node store only a part of the blockchain (called a
shard in this context), instead of the entire blockchain itself. This means that a node that stores a
shard only maintains information on that shard in a shared manner, thus, maintain decentralization.
However, each node doesn’t load the information on the entire blockchain, thus helping in
scalability.
Proof of Work (PoW)11 consensus algorithm cannot be used in conjunction with sharding,
this is because all participant nodes cannot be involved in transaction validation as each node only
has information regarding a particular shard i.e. the shard it belongs to. Thus, the ideas that have
been proposed for blockchain sharding are based on consensus mechanisms like Proof of Stake
(PoS)12.
In Proof of Stake consensus mechanism transaction validation responsibilities are
undertaken by specific designated nodes called “stakers”. Stakers are required to stake their digital
assets such as tokens to participate in transaction validation. A staker earns a part or the entirety of
the transaction fees upon transaction validation. The number of transaction validations allowed for
a staker is directly proportional to the amount and duration of their assets on stake. Additionally,
the Proof of Stake consensus mechanism provides the following advantages over the Proof of
Work:
•

A subset of all nodes validates each transaction instead of the entire network nodes.

•

Absence of mining eliminates the requirement for expensive special-purpose, highperformance hardware including CPUs, GPUs, and SSDs. This consequently decreases the
energy costs.

11
12

https://cointelegraph.com/explained/proof-of-work-explained
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/proof-of-work-vs-proof-of-stake/
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•

It is easy to identify loyal and honest validators based on the amount and duration of the
digital assets staked.

Each shard in a sharded blockchain identifies stakers who assume the transaction validation
responsibilities for that shard. Since transaction validation is done by honest and loyal stakers, it is
easy to presume that the security of the blockchain is still well preserved when compared to
blockchains with Proof of Work mechanisms.

3.3

Answers to Research Questions (RQs)

In this section, we answer the research questions for first-layer scaling solutions raised in Chapter
2 to discuss the design choices for implementing such solutions, their impact on scalability and
limitations. Finally, we will discuss the challenges associated with implementing first-layer scaling
solutions in public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.

3.3.1

RQ1: What are the Design Choices available for implementing first-layer scaling
solutions?

To answer this research question, we will discuss multiple ways in which first layer scaling
solutions can be implemented. We begin the discussion with a thorough look into the design of
segregated witness:
3.3.1.1

Segregated Witness Design

To analyze the idea behind segregated witness, we need to first explain how a current transaction
takes place on the Bitcoin network. This would allow us to demonstrate the potential impact of
segregated witness on scalability, in particular, Bitcoin’s transaction throughput.
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Figure 4: Non-segwit transaction

As shown in Figure 4, with non-Segwit transactions, the signatures needed to unlock the inputs are
included along with the rest of the transaction data in the hash to get the transaction ID (TXID)
(McManus, 2017). Non-segwit transactions include the signatures in the hash to get the TXID.
These transactions are then included in each block up to the 1MB limit in structures called Merkle
Trees.

25

Figure 5: Segwit Transaction

On the other hand, as can be seen in Figure 5, with Segwit transactions, we have two fundamental
changes. Segwit transactions do not hash the signature data. Signature data is stored as “witness”
data in the block.
•

The signature data is not included in the hash to form the TXID. Signatures are still stored
in the block with the transactions as part of “witness” data, but they are longer included in
the TXID hash.

•

The block size limit is changed from 1MB (1,000,000 bytes) to a 4,000,000 “weight” limit,
an arbitrary new metric. A normal byte in a transaction has a weight of 4 while a witness
byte has a weight of 1.

Hence, there are two significant benefits of segwit transactions, which we will discuss now.
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3.3.1.1.1

Transaction Malleability

With Bitcoin transactions before Segwit, there was a bug in the software called “transaction
malleability”. As we know by now, the TXID pre-Segwit is the result of hashing the transaction
data including the signatures. Although there were checks and balances to ensure that the inputs
and outputs couldn’t be changed (i.e. the parties in a transaction and the amounts of Bitcoin being
sent), the signature used to unlock the inputs could be modified slightly (such that it was still a
valid signature) but would completely change the TXID when hashed. With the signature no longer
a part of the TXID in Segwit, transaction malleability is no longer a problem.
3.3.1.1.2

Increased Block Capacity

By changing the block size limit from a byte’s limit to a new 4,000,000 weight limit, the number
of transactions allowed in each block can be increased while maintaining backward compatibility
with the existing cap of 1MB per block. How? Simple math. Our equation for Segwit nodes is as
follows:
4 ∗ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 + (1 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒) = 4,000,000
Non-Segwit nodes in the network will not be able to see the witness data, making their equation:
4 ∗ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 4,000,000
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 1,000,000
So, with Segwit, we’ll never go over the 1MB block size limit on older nodes, making this backward
compatible. Only Segwit nodes will be able to see the signature data, but existing nodes will still
have access to all the transactions.
Segwit won’t bring about nodes with a block size of 4MB though as blocks aren’t
comprised 100% of witness bytes. The actual size of the blocks will depend on the adoption rate of
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Segwit, although the expected average block size will be around 1.7–2MB based on tests showing
around 60% of a transaction to be witness data.

3.3.1.2

Sharding Design Choices

Now, we will discuss the various design choices for implementing sharding that has been proposed
by the blockchain community:
3.3.1.2.1

Scaling by Thousand Altcoins

The co-founder of the Ethereum platform, Vitalik Buterin, introduced the concept of “Scaling by a
thousand Altcoins” in his presentation (Buterin, 2017). This design proposes the use of multiple
blockchains instead of a single blockchain. Each blockchain in this multi-blockchain environment
consists of its own set of validators and is known as a shard. For the rest of this discussion, we use
a generic term “validator” to refer to participants or entities that validate transactions and produce
new blocks, with the help of a suitable consensus mechanism such as mining with Proof of Work,
or via a voting-based mechanism. For now, let’s assume that the shards never communicate with
each other. Although this design is simple, it is sufficient to highlight some of the major challenges
in sharding.

3.3.1.2.1.1 Validator partitioning and Beacon chains

The first challenge is the weakening of security of each shard as having their own validator makes
them several magnitudes insecure than the entire chain. So, if a non-sharded chain with X validators
decides to hard-fork into a sharded blockchain, and splits X validators across 10 shards, each shard
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now only has X/10 validators, and corrupting one shard only requires corrupting (51/10) % or 5.1%
of the total number of validators as can be seen from Figure 6.
This paves the way for the second challenge: Who selects the validators for each shard?
Controlling 5.1% of validators is only damaging if all 5.1% of the validators are in the same shard.
If validators can’t choose which shard they get to validate in, a participant controlling 5.1% of the
validators is highly unlikely to get all their validators in the same shard, heavily reducing their
ability to compromise the system (Skidanov, 2018b).

Figure 6: Validator ability to corrupt a shard

Almost all sharding designs today rely on some source of randomness to assign validators to shards.
Randomness on the blockchain is a challenging topic in itself and requires more research in the
future, but for now, let’s assume there’s some source of randomness we can use.
Both the randomness and the validators assignment require computation that is not specific
to any particular shard. For that computation, practically all existing designs have a separate
blockchain that is tasked with performing operations necessary for the maintenance of the entire
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network. Besides generating random numbers and assigning validators to the shards, these
operations often also include receiving updates from shards and taking snapshots of them,
processing stakes and slashing in Proof-of-Stake systems, and rebalancing shards when that feature
is supported. Such chain is called a Beacon chain in Ethereum.

3.3.1.2.2

Quadratic Sharding

Sharding is often advertised as a solution that scales infinitely with the number of nodes
participating in the network operation. While it is in theory possible to design such a sharding
solution, any solution that has the concept of a Beacon chain doesn’t have infinite scalability. To
understand why, note that the Beacon chain has to do some bookkeeping computation, such as
assigning validators to shards, or snapshotting shard chain blocks, that is proportional to the number
of shards in the system. Since the Beacon chain is itself a single blockchain, with computation
bounded by the computational capabilities of nodes operating it, the number of shards is naturally
limited.
However, the structure of a sharded network does bestow a multiplicative effect on any
improvements to its nodes. Consider the case in which an arbitrary improvement is made to the
efficiency of nodes in the network which will allow them faster transaction processing times.
If the nodes operating the network, including the nodes in the Beacon chain, become four
times faster, then each shard will be able to process four times more transactions, and the Beacon
chain will be able to maintain 4 times more shards. The throughput across the system will increase
by the factor of 4 x 4 = 16, thus, the name quadratic sharding.
It is hard to provide an accurate measurement for how many shards are viable today, but it
is unlikely that in any foreseeable future the throughput needs of blockchain users will outgrow the
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limitations of quadratic sharding. The sheer number of nodes necessary to operate such a volume
of shards securely is orders of magnitude higher than the number of nodes operating all the
blockchains combined today.

3.3.1.2.3

State Sharding

Up until now, we haven’t defined very well what exactly is and is not separated when a network is
divided into shards. Specifically, nodes in the blockchain perform three important tasks: not only
do they 1) process transactions, but they also 2) relay validated transactions and completed blocks
to other nodes and 3) store the state and the history of the entire network ledger. Each of these three
tasks imposes a growing requirement on the nodes operating the network:
•

The necessity to process transactions requires more compute power with the increased
number of transactions being processed;

•

The necessity to relay transactions and blocks requires more network bandwidth with the
increased number of transactions being relayed;

•

The necessity to store data requires more storage as the state grows. Importantly, unlike
the processing power and network, the storage requirement grows even if the transaction
rate (number of transactions processed per second) remains constant.
From the above list, it might appear that the storage requirement would be the most pressing

since it is the only one that is being increased over time even if the number of transactions per
second doesn’t change, but in practice, the most pressing requirement today is the compute power.
The entire state of Ethereum as of this writing is 100GB, easily manageable by most of the nodes.
But the number of transactions Ethereum can process is around 20, orders of magnitude less than
what is needed for many practical use cases.
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Practically, under State sharding, the nodes in each shard build their own blockchain that
contains transactions that affect only the local part of the global state that is assigned to that shard.
Therefore, the validators in the shard only need to store their local part of the global state and only
execute, and as such only relay, transactions that affect their part of the state. This partition linearly
reduces the requirement on all compute power, storage, and network bandwidth, but introduces
new problems, which will be discussed in RQ2.

3.3.2

RQ2: What are the limitations of these designs?

We will now discuss some of the limitations and challenges that arise based on the designs of
segregated witness and sharding:
3.3.2.1

Segregated Witness Limitations

Some of the risks associated with Segregated witness are as follows:
•

Miners would get lower transaction fees for each transaction.

•

Segwit implementation is complex and it requires that all the wallets implement segwit
themselves.

•

Segwit would significantly increase the amount of resources required to maintain the
network since, the network capacity, transactions, bandwidth would increase.

•

It might result in a hard fork of the Bitcoin network which may ultimately, decrease the
financial value of both the networks.

•

Finally, Segwit would be difficult to maintain. The sidechain containing the signature data
will need to be maintained by miners as well. However, unlike the main blockchain, the
miners have no financial benefits on doing so. Hence, some sort of reward protocol needs
to be implemented to incentivize the miners to maintain the signatures on the sidechain.
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3.3.2.2

Sharding Limitations

There are three main issues that arise with the proposed sharding solutions. We will assess these
limitations in detail in this section:

3.3.2.2.1

Cross-shard transactions

“Scaling by a thousand Altcoin” as a model is not a very useful approach to sharding, because if
individual shards cannot communicate with each other, they are no better than multiple independent
blockchains. Even today, when sharding is not available, there’s a huge demand for interoperability
between various blockchains.
Let’s for now only consider simple payment transactions, where each participant has an
account on exactly one shard. If one wishes to transfer money from one account to another within
the same shard, the transaction can be processed entirely by the validators in that shard. If, however,
Alice that resides on shard 1 wants to send money to Bob who resides on shard 2, neither validators
on shard 1(they won’t be able to credit Bob’s account) nor the validators on shard 2 (they won’t be
able to debit Alice’s account) can process the entire transaction. There are two families of
approaches to cross-shard transactions:
•

Synchronous: whenever a cross-shard transaction needs to be executed, the blocks in
multiple shards that contain state transition related to the transaction get all produced at the
same time, and the validators of multiple shards collaborate on executing such transactions.

•

Asynchronous: a cross-shard transaction that affects multiple shards is executed in those
shards asynchronously, the “Credit” shard executing its half once it has sufficient evidence
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that the “Debit” shard has executed its portion. This system is today proposed in Cosmos 13,
Ethereum Serenity14, Near15, Kadena16, and others. A problem with this approach lies in
that if blocks are produced independently, there’s a non-zero chance that one of the
multiple blocks will be orphaned, thus making the transaction only partially applied.
Consider Figure 7 below that depicts two shards both of which encountered a fork, and a
cross-shard transaction that was recorded in blocks A and X’ correspondingly. If the chains
A-B and V’-X’-Y’-Z’ end up being canonical in the corresponding shards, the transaction
is fully finalized. If A’-B’-C’-D’ and V-X become canonical, then the transaction is fully
abandoned, which is acceptable. But if, for example, A-B and V-X become canonical, then
one part of the transaction is finalized, and one is abandoned, creating an atomicity failure.

Figure 7: Cross-shard transactions

13

https://cosmos.network/
https://medium.com/utopiapress/what-is-ethereum-serenity-f433d824c974
15 https://nearprotocol.com/
16 https://kadena.io/en/
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Note that communication between chains is useful outside of sharded blockchains too.
Interoperability between chains is a complex problem that many projects are trying to solve. In
sharded blockchains, the problem is somewhat easier since the block structure and consensus are
the same across shards, and there’s a beacon chain that can be used for coordination. In a sharded
blockchain, however, all the shard chains are the same, while in the global blockchains ecosystem
there are lots of different blockchains, with different target use cases, decentralization and privacy
guarantees.
Building a system in which a set of chains have different properties but use sufficiently
similar consensus and block structure and have a common beacon chain could enable an ecosystem
of heterogeneous blockchains that have a working interoperability subsystem. Such a system is
unlikely to feature validator rotation, so some extra measures need to be taken to ensure security.

3.3.2.2.2

Malicious Forks

A set of malicious validators might attempt to create a fork. Note that it doesn’t matter if the
underlying consensus is BFT or not, corrupting a sufficient number of validators will always make
it possible to create a fork.
It is significantly more likely for more than 50% of a single shard to be corrupted than for
more than 50% of the entire network to be corrupted. As discussed above, cross-shard transactions
involve certain state changes in multiple shards, and the corresponding blocks in such shards that
apply such state changes must either be all finalized (i.e. appear in the selected chains on their
corresponding shards), or all be orphaned (i.e. not appear in the selected chains on their
corresponding shards). Since generally the probability of shards being corrupted is not negligible,

35
we can’t assume that the forks won’t happen even if a Byzantine consensus was reached among the
shard validators, or many blocks were produced on top of the block with the state change.
This problem has multiple solutions, the most common one being occasional cross-linking
of the latest shard chain block to the beacon chain. The fork choice rule in the shard chains is then
changed to always prefer the chain that is cross-linked and only apply the shard-specific fork-choice
rule for blocks that were published since the last cross-link.

3.3.2.2.3

Approving invalid blocks

A set of validators might attempt to create a block that applies the state transition function
incorrectly. For example, starting with a state in which Alice has 10 tokens and Bob has 0 tokens
(see Figure 8), the block might contain a transaction that sends 10 tokens from Alice to Bob, but
ends up with a state in which Alice has 0 tokens and Bob has 1000 tokens.

Figure 8: Approving invalid blocks

In a classic non-sharded blockchain such an attack is not possible since all the participant in the
network validates all the blocks, and the block with such an invalid state transition will be rejected
by both other block producers and the participants of the network that do not create blocks. Even
if the malicious validators continue creating blocks on top of such an invalid block faster than
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honest validators build the correct chain, thus having the chain with the invalid block being longer,
it doesn’t matter, since every participant that is using the blockchain for any purpose validates all
the blocks and discards all the blocks built on top of the invalid block.

Figure 9: Malicious and honest validator behavior

Figure 9 shows five validators, three of whom are malicious. They created an invalid block A’, and
then continued building new blocks on top of it. Two honest validators discarded A’ as invalid and
were building on top of the last valid block known to them, creating a fork. Since there are fewer
validators in the honest fork, their chain is shorter. However, in the classic non-sharded blockchain,
every participant that uses blockchain for any purpose is responsible for validating all the blocks
they receive and recomputing the state. Thus, any person who has any interest in the blockchain
would observe that A’ is invalid, and thus also immediately discard B’, C’ and D’, as such taking
the chain A-B as the current longest valid chain.
In a sharded blockchain, however, no participant can validate all the transactions on all the
shards, so they need to have some way to confirm that at no point in the history of any shard of the
blockchain no invalid block was included.
Note that unlike with forks, cross-linking to the Beacon chain is not a sufficient solution,
since the Beacon chain doesn’t have the capacity to validate the blocks. It can only validate that a
sufficient number of validators in that shard signed the block (and as such attested to its
correctness).
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3.3.3

RQ3: What are the problems associated with implementing First Layer scalability
solutions in public blockchains?

Since first-layer scaling solutions require a change in the codebase of an existing blockchain, these
changes are incredibly difficult to implement in public permissionless blockchains such as
Ethereum and Bitcoin. This problem arises because of the political decentralization nature of these
blockchains. In order for such protocol changes, all the nodes on the blockchain network must agree
on the change in protocol otherwise this change may create a hard-fork of the network which
ultimately decreases its financial value. For instance, both Ethereum and Bitcoin suffered from
hard-forks of their mainchain which led to the creation of Bitcoin Cash and Ethereum Classic. On
the bright side, this difficulty in protocol change implementation on a public blockchain has given
birth to in other innovative approaches of targeting blockchain scalability without changing the
original codebase of such blockchains, but by implementing a second layer of blockchain on top of
the mainchain. These solutions are known as second-layer scalability solutions and the most
prominent of such proposals are the concept of sidechains, which are discussed in further detail in
the next chapter.
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Chapter 4.

Second Layer Scaling Solutions

As discussed in Chapter 3, the proposed first-layer scaling solutions (Bala & Manoharan, 2018),
(Ehmke, Wessling, & Friedrich, 2018) require a change in the protocol of blockchains which is
extremely difficult to implement, especially in public blockchains due to their decentralized nature.
A change in protocol needs to be agreed upon by all the peers on the blockchain network otherwise
it may result in a hard-fork which may ultimately, reduce its value. This makes it extremely difficult
to test changes to a pre-existing blockchain protocol or to add new functionality to it. Additionally,
there has been a huge surge in blockchain-based systems in the recent years, for instance, Bitcoin
is primarily supports peer-to-peer payment network, Ethereum is used for the deployment of
decentralized applications and Hyperledger Fabric (Androulaki et al., 2018) is used for the
enhancement of supply-chains17. Thus, it is hard to envision a single blockchain ‘to rule them all’
for the future. It would be more worthwhile instead to make these disparate blockchains
interoperable so, that they can communicate and interact with one another.
In 2014, realizing this hindrance in the growth and further adoption of blockchains for
building advanced, complicated and scalable software systems, Back et al. (Back et al., 2014)
proposed a new and innovative method for improving the versatility and interoperability of
traditional blockchains. In their paper, they proposed the idea of “sidechains” for the Bitcoin
blockchain.

17

https://cointelegraph.com/news/walmart-ibm-blockchain-initiative-aims-to-track-global-food-supply-chain

39
4.1

Sidechains

Sidechains are secondary blockchains which are connected to other blockchains by means of a twoway peg. A two-way peg is a mechanism that allows the bidirectional transfer of assets between
the mainchain and the sidechain at a fixed or pre-deterministic exchange rate. Sidechains may have
their own protocol and implementation which can be completely different from the main
blockchain. Such adjustability provides the users flexibility to access various other functionalities
and features offered on a sidechain by using the assets they already own on the main blockchain.
Furthermore, sidechains are isolated from the main blockchain in such a way that in the case of a
cryptographic break (or a maliciously designed sidechain), the damage is entirely confined to the
sidechain itself.
Although promising, the sidechain technology is still relatively new and immature. There
is a lack of comparative and empirical studies both in academic and industrial environments to
analyze such multi-blockchain systems in a comprehensive manner. Hence, the motivation behind
this chapter is to provide the first comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art sidechain platforms
(which represent the most commonly used implementations of sidechain technology - hereafter
referred to as sidechains) to understand the design choices, advancements, use cases, consensus
mechanisms, asset transfer protocols and limitations of sidechains.

4.2

Answers to Research Questions (RQs)

In this section, we answer the research questions raised for second layer scaling solutions in Chapter
2. We start the discussion by explaining what and how a two-way peg works, what are the available
design choices, their advantages, and limitations. We will then look at four state-of-the-art
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sidechain platforms namely Loom, POA, Liquid and RSK while discussing their use cases,
consensus mechanisms, asset transfer protocols, and their limitations.

4.2.1

RQ1: What are the available design choices for implementing two-way pegs?

To understand the fundamentals and design choices for implementing a two-way peg enabled
sidechain, we will discuss a trivial example in this section. Let us assume a sidechain is attached to
a public and permissionless primary blockchain with a two-way peg. The primary blockchain: 1)
operates a cryptocurrency called MainCoin and 2) cannot execute non-trivial smart contracts due
to the absence of a Turing complete Virtual Machine. The sidechain: 1) operates its own
cryptocurrency of named SideCoin, 2) has the capability of executing non-trivial smart contracts
and 3) offers significantly higher transaction rate (i.e. higher transactions per second) than the
mainchain. For the sake of simplicity in such multi-blockchain environment, the primary
blockchain is called the parent blockchain (or mainchain) and the sidechain attached to it is called
a secondary chain (the terms sidechain and secondary chains will be used interchangeably
throughout the rest of this paper). In our example, a two-way peg allows the transfer of MainCoins
from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice versa at a fixed rate of 1 MainCoin = 1 SideCoin.
Suppose a user wishes to transfer 5 MainCoins from the mainchain to the sidechain to play a rock,
paper and scissor game with another random user based on a smart contract (where winner takes
all and a draw results in no exchange of coins) implemented on the sidechain, then this system
could work in the following abstract manner:
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Figure 10: Transfer of funds between mainchain and sidechain with a two-way peg

1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a special address (also known as a lock-box) where the
coins are locked and can only be unlocked once funds on sidechain are locked and
transferred back to the mainchain.
2. Once the funds locked on the mainchain, 5 SideCoins are created on the sidechain.
3. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins.
4. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw).
5. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, which essentially means
that the SideCoins will be locked/destroyed on the sidechain and an equivalent number of
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MainCoins will be unlocked on the mainchain from the lock-box (in step 1) after SideCoins
are destroyed on the sidechain.
The above steps are summarized in Figure 10 and can vary depending on the way in which
a two-way peg has been implemented for the sidechain (sub-subsection 4.2.1.1). With this model,
the total number of MainCoins in the mainchain ecosystem remains conserved whilst adding new
functionality to it, i.e. execution of non-trivial smart contracts and faster transaction rates.
Moreover, the implementation of these new features with sidechains do not require any major
change in the core features or consensus protocol of the mainchain itself.
Based on our analysis, there are currently three major design choices for implementing a
two-way peg for transferring assets from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice versa. These
design choices are discussed below.

4.2.1.1

Centralized two-way pegs

The simplest way to implement a two-way peg is to have a trusted third entity hold custody of the
locked funds. In this design, the trusted entity is solely responsible for locking and unlocking of
funds on both the mainchain and its sidechain. Figure 11 shows the relevant steps in which the
entire process of fund transfer takes place, both from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice
versa.
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Figure 11: Centralized two-way peg implementation

Based on this two-way peg design, the steps for fund transfer (based on our example above) are
modified in the following manner:
1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a lock-box address maintained by a trusted centralized
entity meant for regulating fund transfer between the two blockchains.
2. The trusted entity then generates 5 SideCoins on the sidechain and sends these funds to the
user’s requested address.
3. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins.
4. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw).
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5. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, by sending their SideCoins
to the lock-box address on the sidechain which is also maintained by the same trusted
central entity. The user(s) also specify the address where the funds need to be sent on the
mainchain.
6. The trusted central entity destroys the SideCoins on the sidechain and sends the equivalent
number of MainCoins to address specified by the user(s).

4.2.1.2

Multi-Signature or Federated two-way pegs

An improvement over centralized two-way pegs are the federated two-way pegs (Back et al.,
2014), (Dilley et al., 2016). In such a design, a group of entities or notaries control the lock-box
rather than just one central entity. Consequently, the entire federation or group collectively holds
custody of the locked funds and regulates fund transfer between the primary blockchain and its
sidechain. The fund transfer takes place only when the majority of the entities i.e. ‘n’ out of ‘m’
entities (where ‘n’ is the majority and ‘m’ is the total number of entities in the federation) within
the Federation sign the transaction (Deng, Chen, Zeng, & Zhang, 2018). Figure 12 demonstrates
the sequential steps with which fund transfer takes place between the two blockchains using a
federated two-way peg.
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Figure 12: Federated two-way peg implementation

Based on a federated two-way peg design, the steps for fund transfer (based on our example
above) are modified as follows:
1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a lock-box address maintained by a federation of entities
meant for regulating fund transfer between the two blockchains. The entities of the
federation then sign this transaction after verifying that the funds have been received in the
lock-box.
2. If the majority of the entities within the Federation sign the transaction, then the federation
generates 5 SideCoins on the sidechain and sends these funds to the user’s requested
address.
3. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins.
4. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw).
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5. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, by sending their SideCoins
to the lock-box address on the sidechain which is also maintained by the same federation
of entities. The user(s) also specify the address where the funds need to be sent on the
mainchain.
6. The entities of the federation again sign the transaction after verifying that the funds have
been received in the lock-box on the sidechain.
7. If the majority of the entities sign the transaction, then the federation destroys the SideCoins
on the sidechain and sends the equivalent number of MainCoins to address specified by the
user(s).
8. In the case when the majority of the entities within the federation do not reach an agreement
regarding a transaction, then the funds are sent back to their respective owners on either
chain.

4.2.1.3

Simplified Payment Verification (SPV)

Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) allows a lightweight 18 client to prove that a given
transaction was included in a legitimate block of the longest Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchain,
without having to download the entire chain from the genesis block itself. These lightweight (or
SPV) clients are only required to download the block headers of the entire blockchain, which are
much smaller in size than the actual block itself. To verify if a given transaction was included in a
legitimate block, an SPV client requests a proof of inclusion, in the form of a Merkle branch of that
transaction. Figure 13 demonstrates the entire process of transfer of funds from the mainchain to
the sidechain and vice versa based on two-way peg implemented with SPV proofs.

18

https://www.mycryptopedia.com/full-node-lightweight-node/
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Figure 13: Two-way peg based on SPV proofs

SPV proofs indirect proofs in the sense that a given transaction is not proven to be consistent with
the entire blockchain from the genesis block itself. Instead, it is shown to be a part of valid block
upon which miners have mined newer blocks, subsequently forming the longest chain. The way
in which this is done is as follows:
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Figure 14: A block of transaction hash Merkle tree

1. After a transaction is submitted for the transfer of funds from the mainchain to the sidechain
or vice versa (i.e. the funds are locked in the lockbox), there is a confirmation period, which
is strategically in place to allow miners to mine on top of the last block which consequently,
allows the generation and submission of SPV proof.
2. The SPV proof is then submitted by the user and the block in which his/her transaction is
recorded is located.
3. The user then provides the hashes along the Merkle tree branch on which his/her
transaction lies. This is done in the following manner:
a. Suppose a user is looking to validate Transaction 2 (Figure 14), he/she can obtain
the hash of Transaction 1 and a combined hash of Transaction 3 and 4 i.e.
Transaction (3, 4) from a number of other full nodes.
b. With this information, the user can compute the root hash of the Merkle tree in the
block.
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4. If these hashes all collectively hash to the original Merkle root of the transaction hash tree
in that block, then the transaction is valid.

After an SPV proof is submitted there is a reorganization or reorg period in which other
users may submit their own SPV proofs to contradict the user’s transaction. The SPV proof in
which more blocks have been mined is considered to be the correct proof and decides the fate of
the transaction.
Given an SPV based two-way peg design, the steps for fund transfer (based on our
example above) are modified as follows:
1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a lock-box address which is usually maintained by the
miners of the network. Once the coins are locked on the mainchain, the user has to wait for
a predetermined confirmation period to allow the mines to create new blocks to create SPV
proofs.
2. Once sufficient blocks are created by the miners, the user can submit an SPV proof
verifying that the coins were locked on the mainchain.
3. After the SPV proof is submitted, the user has to wait for the reorg-period where other
users can submit their SPV proofs to nullify fraudulent transactions, in case one has taken
place.
4. After the SPV proof is verified 5 SideCoins are unlocked on the sidechain.
5. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins.
6. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw).
7. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, by sending their SideCoins
to the lock-box address on the sidechain and repeating the same process mentioned in steps
1 – 4 on the sidechain side.
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4.2.2

RQ2: What are the advantages and limitations of these design choices?

The advantages and limitations of each of the design choices discussed in RQ1 are discussed
below:
4.2.2.1

Advantages of centralized two-way pegs

There are two major advantages of using a centralized two-way peg design: 1) Centralized twoway pegs are easy to visualize and implement due to their simplistic design which involves just
one entity to oversee the transfer of assets between blockchains. 2) the design could provide
extremely fast transfer of funds from the parent blockchain to its sidechain and vice versa as the
central entity generally requires a simple proof of locked funds in the lockbox, which they can
verify themselves at any given time.

4.2.2.2

Disadvantages of centralized two-way pegs

Using a trusted central entity comes with its own drawbacks, such as: 1) Public blockchains such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum are designed to improve political decentralization and using such a twoway peg design introduces a degree of political centralization as one has to trust a single entity to
manage fund transfer from a primary blockchain to a sidechain and vice versa. 2) Using a
centralized two-way peg design introduces a single point of failure in such multi-blockchain
ecosystems as unforeseen circumstances such as power failures, hardware failures or natural
disasters would temporarily or permanently cease asset transfers between the blockchains, which
would cripple the sidechain network and 3) If the centralized entity is rogue or malicious, it can
steal all the funds stored in the lock-box.
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4.2.2.3

Advantages of federated two-way pegs

The advantages of using a federated two-way peg design are: 1) It improves upon centralized twoway peg design by improving the political decentralization of such multi-blockchain systems to
some extent and 2) These designs could be implemented with specialized federation protocols for
fast transfer of funds between the blockchains. Some of these protocols are Strong Federations
(Dilley et al., 2016) (which is discussed further in RQ3c).

4.2.2.4

Disadvantages of federated two-way pegs

Federated two-way pegs can have drawbacks such as 1) Such design does not entirely eliminate
the political centralization problem as this design still relies on a small group of entities to
regulate and manage fund transfer between blockchains and 2) Funds in the lock-box could be
stolen if the majority of the entities of a federation lose their private keys due to a malicious
internet attack or social engineering.

4.2.2.5

Advantages of SPV based two-way pegs

The main advantage of an SPV based two-way peg is that it eliminates the third party required for
fund transfer between two blockchains as in case of Centralized and Federated two-way pegs.

4.2.2.6

Disadvantages of SPV based two-way pegs

A disadvantage of an SPV based design is that these designs tend to be slow as a user needs to
wait for confirmation and reorg periods before having access to his/her funds on either mainchain
or sidechain.
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Table 4: Summary of advantages and disadvantages of two-way peg designs
Two-way peg
Advantages

Disadvantages

Design

•
Centralized

•
•
•

Federated
•

SPV

•

Asset transfer between
blockchains can be fast
Simple design and
implementation
Better political
decentralization than
centralized two-way pegs
Asset transfer between
blockchains can be fast
Can work well with the
right number and type of
entities that form the
federation (see Chapter 5)
Politically decentralized

•
•
•

Politically centralized
Introduces a single point of
failure
assets can be stolen by a
malicious central entity

•
•

Not politically decentralized
Assets can be stolen if private
keys of the majority of entities
are stolen

•

Slow transfer of assets between
blockchains

Table 4 summarizes the Centralized, Federated and SPV based two-way peg designs based on their
advantages and disadvantages.

4.2.3

RQ3: Which state-of-the-art platforms are implementing sidechains?

We will now discuss four major state-of-the-art sidechain platforms namely Loom (Loom, n.d.-b),
(Loom, n.d.-a), Proof-of-Authority (POA) Network (Arasev, 2018), (POA, n.d.-b), Liquid (Dilley
et al., 2016), (Blockstream, n.d.) and RootStock (RSK) (S. D. Lerner, 2015), (RSK, n.d.)
that improve scalability and facilitate interoperability in the multi-blockchain ecosystem. We chose
these platforms based on the following reasons:
•

Popularity in the community: The popularity of a platform was determined by either one
or both of the following criteria: 1) the number of users that are registered on the platform
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(e.g. CryptoZombies 19 a DApp on Loom has accumulated over 240,000 users since going
live (Bentley, 2018)) and 2) partnership of the sidechain platform with prominent or wellknown blockchain companies or organizations (e.g. BitPay20 and BITMAIN21) (POA, n.d.c), (RootStock, n.d.), (O`KeeffeDaniel, 2018).
•

Availability of documentations, white papers, forums and technical support (Loom, n.d.b), (Dilley et al., 2016), (S. D. Lerner, 2015), (POA, n.d.-a), (Arasev, 2018).

4.2.3.1

Loom

Loom (Loom, n.d.-b), (Loom, n.d.-a) is a platform for running Decentralized Applications (DApps)
and games on sidechains connected to the Ethereum Blockchain. It utilizes the Delegated Proof-ofStake (DPoS) protocol to reach consensus. Each DApp runs on its own sidechain (called a
DAppChain) pegged to the Ethereum main-net. This allows the users and developers to run multiple
nodes for an application on the sidechain. Along with the Delegated Proof-of-Stake consensus,
Loom runs on a Byzantine-fault-tolerant state machine replication as a backend P2P layer called
Tendermint 22. In the Loom architecture, a transaction on the Loom network is not immediately
settled on the Ethereum mainchain but instead, they are settled in bulk in order to increase
scalability.

4.2.3.2

POA Network

The POA network (Arasev, 2018), (POA, n.d.-b) is an open-source public Ethereum sidechain for
developing smart contracts. It uses Proof of Authority (POA, 2017) as its consensus protocol. The
platform provides the users and developers of smart contracts and decentralized applications with

19

https://cryptozombies.io/
https://bitpay.com/
21 https://www.bitmain.com/
22 https://tendermint.com/
20
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the flexibility to develop on Ethereum standards with more scalability and interoperability between
other blockchain networks.
POA network supports native Solidity (“Solidity,” n.d.) smart contracts, which allows
effortless portability of smart contracts and decentralized applications from the Ethereum
environment to the POA network. The platform charges minimal transaction fees which combined
with about four magnitudes in transaction speed over Ethereum encourages and promotes the
development of scalable games and applications. Additionally, POA provides bridging (especially
for ERC-721 tokens) capabilities which allows users to transfer their non-fungible tokens from one
blockchain to another easily.

4.2.3.3

Liquid

Liquid (Dilley et al., 2016), (Blockstream, n.d.) is a commercial sidechain by Blockstream. It
enables instantaneous movement of funds between exchanges, without waiting for the delay of
confirmation in the Bitcoin blockchain. The transactions on the Liquid platform are completed in
an average of two minutes. Liquid supports private transactions which allow traders and exchanges
to trade/transact in private, preventing front-running of large orders.
Liquid also supports Issued assets where an organization or a company that serves as the
custodian of assets (physical or cryptocurrency), can issue a tokenized version of the asset using
the platform. Once the assets are tokenized on the Liquid platform, they can be traded freely within
the network, taking advantage of Liquid’s speed and private trading features. The Liquid Network
consists of a ‘Strong Federation’ (Dilley et al., 2016) (discussed in RQ3c) which consists of several
financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges who all run high-performance computing
hardware to secure the network.
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4.2.3.4

RootStock (RSK)

RSK (S. D. Lerner, 2015), (RSK, n.d.) is an open-source sidechain pegged to the Bitcoin main-net
for the execution of smart contracts, it is an evolution of QixCoin (“Qixcoin,” n.d.), a Turingcomplete cryptocurrency developed in 2013. RSK implements the concept of merged mining (S.
Lerner, 2016) which provides incentives to the miners of the Bitcoin blockchain to be actively
involved by mining on RSK platform.
RSK incorporates a Turing complete, resource-accounted, and deterministic virtual
machine (called the RootStock Virtual Machine or RVM) for the parallel execution of smart
contracts in the Bitcoin ecosystem by several nodes. The execution of smart contracts can result in
the processing of messages between multiple other smart contracts, creation of new transactions or
change of a state of smart contract’s persistent memory. RVM is compatible with Ethereum’s
Virtual Machine (EVM) at op-code level which allows the execution of Solidity (“Solidity,” n.d.)
smart contracts on RSK.

4.2.4

RQ3a: What are the use cases of these platforms?

The use cases of each platform are now discussed to answer this research question:
4.2.4.1

Loom Use Cases

The Loom network has mainly been used for the following use cases:
•

Digital Social Interaction: The original use case of the Loom Network is DelegateCall 23
which is a forum where questions can be asked and each answer that a user provides and
upvotes earns them ‘Karma’. Karma can be traded on the Ethereum chain for ERC-20

23

https://delegatecall.com/
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tokens. ERC-20 tokens are fungible tokens, or coins, on the Ethereum Network which are
not unique and can be divided into smaller portions.
•

Game development: The second use case for the Loom Network is for running games
such as games built on Unity24. Games require quick transaction times and the performance
of the mainchain is much faster than it would be if the games were run on the Ethereum
blockchain itself. The gas fees required for the transactions on the Loom sidechain are
much less than on the Ethereum chain making it more practical for game development.

4.2.4.2

POA Use cases

The purpose of the POA network is to prove the possibility of cross-chain transfers between an
Ethereum chain and a sidechain. Interoperability is a major goal of the POA Network along with
an increase in scalability and the connectivity of Ethereum. POA aims to have a solution to
communicating between two stand-alone blockchains. Some of the major projects that have used
the POA network as of November 2018 are as follows:
•

Swarm City25, a decentralized commerce platform, has used the ERC20 to ERC20 bridge
to transfer tokens from the Ethereum chain to Kovan test-net26

•

Sentinel Chain (Lai, 2018) is transferring ERC20 tokens from the Sentinel Chain to other
EVM-based blockchains.

•

Virtue Poker 27 has used the POA bridge along with their own sidechain to eliminate
expensive transactions.

•

24

Colu Network28 has partnered with the POA network to connect their own sidechain.

https://unity3d.com/
https://swarm.city/
26 https://kovan-testnet.github.io/website/
27 https://virtue.poker/
28 https://cln.network/
25
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•

POA network is additionally working with more projects to help deal with the scalability
and high gas cost of the Ethereum network.

4.2.4.3

Liquid Use cases

Since, strong federations were designed to provide solutions to problems related to transaction
latency, commercial privacy, reliability and fungibility, the most prominent use case of the Liquid
platform is in international exchange:
•

International Exchange: Bitcoin can facilitate cross border payments and remittance, but
it is limited by its own design choice that hampers its performance (Karame, Androulaki,
& Capkun, 2012). It also suffers the wrath of market-dynamics like most if not all
cryptocurrencies at this time. Consequently, the high latency of the Bitcoin network
requires Bitcoin to be tied up in multiple exchanges and brokerage environments. The lack
of privacy also adds to its cost of operation. Additionally, local currency trade with Bitcoin
can be a subject to illiquidity due to market fragmentation because of which many
organizations and commercial entities choose to operate or design their own highfrequency methods of exchange (Moore & Christin, 2013). These solutions and
workarounds have often introduced in centralized systems and other issues (Karame et al.,
2012). Thus, with strong federations, Liquid, introduces improved security and privacy,
with lower latency than the Bitcoin network.

4.2.4.4

RSK Use cases

The compatibility of RVM with EVM opens the door up for the implementation of several
innovative smart contracts and use cases as it allows the developers working on the Ethereum
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platform to take advantage of Bitcoin’s robustness. Some of the most important use cases are
discussed below:
•

Retail Payment Systems: With the implementation of RSK, Bitcoin could be adopted
globally for day-to-day retail transactions. In its current state, it is not feasible to use
Bitcoins in retail due to its slow confirmation time (~ 10 minutes – 1 hour to ensure
irreversibility). RSK can allow consumers to have the security of Bitcoin with faster
transaction times (~ 10 seconds). This would allow merchants to accept payments faster
without having to rely on third-party gateways. Additionally, the RSK platform can handle
a high volume of transactions per second (~ 300 - 1000 transactions per second) which is
yet another necessity for a payment processing platform to succeed in the retail industry.

•

Supply Chain Traceability: With RSK smart contracts could be implemented to track and
trace the physical location and condition of a product. Such contracts could be particularly
useful in food, retail, healthcare, and transportation industries. Once again, such contracts
would be backed by the security and robustness of the Bitcoin protocol.

•

Digital Identity: Developing countries struggle with the lack of documentation and
identification for the poor, which can prevent them from voting, accessing healthcare and
financial aid, reporting criminal activities. Hence, with RSK digital global registries could
be implemented at extremely low costs, this could be a major step in the improvement of
the overall infrastructure of such countries.

4.2.5

RQ3b: How does asset transfer take place on these platforms?

We now discuss the asset transfer protocol in each of the platform discussed in RQ3 to answer this
research question:
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4.2.5.1

Asset transfers on the Loom Platform

The Loom network has plans to allow for ERC721 and ERC20 tokens to be transferred from the
Ethereum blockchain to the DAppChain and vice-versa using Plasma-based relays 29 . At the
moment, Loom only allows for ERC721 tokens to be traded on the network. ERC721 tokens are
non-fungible tokens meaning that they can be collected, and each individual token is unique and
irreplaceable. Currently, Loom uses a Transfer Gateway to support the transfer of these tokens.
When the tokens are being deposited to the DAppChain, the tokens are sent to a gateway contract
before being sent to the Gateway Oracle where the transfer is forwarded to the Gateway Contract
on the DAppChain. Figure 15 shows the asset transfer from the Ethereum blockchain to the
DAppChain.

Figure 15: Asset transfer from Ethereum to DAppChain
29

https://blog.gridplus.io/introducing-trusted-relay-networks-6c168f72a6f6
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The Gateway Oracle typically runs on nodes that are serving as delegators for the Delegated Proof
of Stake consensus algorithms although a gateway oracle can run on nodes that are standalone. If
the tokens are being withdrawn from the DAppChain back to the Ethereum mainchain, the tokens
are sent back to the Transfer Gateway Oracle where the user submits a Merkle proof of the user’s
transaction history and the withdrawal awaits a signature of approval. With this signed withdrawal
record, the user may withdraw tokens back to the Ethereum mainchain. Figure 16 shows the asset
transfer from the DAppChain to the Ethereum blockchain.

Figure 16: Asset transfer from Ethereum to DAppChain

The mainchain gateway contract needs to approve of the signature produced by the Gateway
Oracle. When a user initially deposits tokens to the DAppChain from the mainchain, an address
mapper contract creates a mapping of both the private key for Ethereum and the private key for the
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DAppChain. The reason that a signature is not required for depositing to the sidechain but is
required for withdrawing back to the mainchain is that the signature is used to decrease the
dependence on the personalized consensus algorithm being used on the sidechain when in need of
transferring. The Ethereum mainchain, on the other hand, has a more trusted consensus algorithm.

4.2.5.2

Asset transfers on the POA network

There are three different types of transfers that can take place.
•

Native to ERC20: In this case, “Native” refers to the POA tokens. POA tokens are locked
in a smart contract and POA20 tokens are then generated on the Ethereum blockchain. The
POA20 tokens are the POA equivalent of the ERC20 tokens that are found on the Ethereum
blockchain. These tokens are burned on the Ethereum blockchain before the smart contract
is activated and the tokens are unlocked on the POA blockchain.

•

ERC20 to ERC20: Token “X” from the first Ethereum network is locked on the first
Ethereum Network. Token “Y” is generated on the second Ethereum network and then
burned on the second network. The smart contract is activated, and the Token “X” is
unlocked on the primary Ethereum network. The difference between this bridge and the
first Native to ERC20 bridge is instead of the bridge only supporting the transfer of tokens
to and from the POA network this bridge allows for the transfer of tokens between any two
networks operating on the Ethereum chain.

•

ERC20 to Native: The ERC-20 to Native bridge allows for the transfer of DAI tokens
from the Ethereum Network to the xDAI chain. The DAI token is an ERC-20 token that
maintains a 1:1 ratio with the United States Dollar (USD) meaning that each DAI token is
always worth exactly one US dollar. The xDAI chain is an Ethereum based blockchain
using the USD-stable XDAI token. DAI tokens differ from XDAI tokens by the fact that
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DAI tokens live on the Ethereum mainchain whereas the XDAI tokens live on a separate
xDAI sidechain. It also maintains a ratio of 1:1 with the US Dollar and is backed by
Ethereum collateral. XDAI tokens are minted on the xDAI chain network and burned on
the xDAI chain network. The Smart Contract is activated, and the DAI tokens are unlocked
on the Ethereum network. A subset of the total number of validators function as validators
for each set of bridge transactions. Also, each bridge is bilaterally allowing for a transfer
back and forth between two blockchains. The transfers happen within one’s own wallet by
having representations of tokens on one network be minted on the other network.

4.2.5.3

Asset transfers on the Liquid Platform

Native Assets: The Liquid network supports accounting of other assets (including traditional
currencies, real-world assets, and other cryptocurrencies) in addition to Bitcoin. These are known
as native assets and are accounted separately from the base Bitcoin cryptocurrency. These assets
can be issued by any participant by means of a special asset-generating transaction. They can also
optionally set conditions by which additional issuance can take place in the future:
•

A policy for an asset being generated is decided upon by the asset issuer, which includes
conditions for asset redemption.

•

The asset issuer creates a transaction with one or more special asset-generating inputs,
whose value is the full issuance of the asset. This transaction uniquely identifies the asset.

•

A member of the strong federation confirms the asset-generating transaction after which
the assets become transactable.

•

The asset issuer then distributes these assets to its user-base as per requirement. This is
done by using standard strong federation transactions.
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•

When the users wish to redeem their asset tokens, they transfer their asset holdings back to
the issuer in return for out-of-band goods or the provided service. The issuer then destroys
these tokens.

Peg-out Authorization: When Bitcoins are frozen on the Bitcoin blockchain and pegged into the
Liquid network they become Liquid Bitcoin (L-BTC). The L-BTCs can be then utilized on the
Liquid network and can be transferred back to the Bitcoin blockchain at any given time. As
discussed earlier, moving assets back to the Bitcoin blockchain is foreseen and mediated by a set
of watchmen, who create the transactions on the Bitcoin side. These transactions take place with
the help of peg-out authorization proofs which have the following design:
•

Setup: Each participant i chooses two public-private keypairs: (Pi, pi) and (Qi , qi), where
pi is an “online key” and qi is an “offline key”. The participant then provides Pi and Qi to
the watchmen.

•

Authorization: To authorize a key W (which will correspond to an individually-controlled
Bitcoin address), a participant takes the following steps.
➢ They compute Lj = Pj + H(W + Qj )(W + Qj ) for every other participant index j,
where H is a random oracle hash that maps group elements to scalars.
➢ The participant knows the discrete logarithm of Li, and can, therefore, produce a
ring signature over every Li. They do so by signing the full list of online and offline
keys as well as W.
➢ The participant sends the resulting ring signature to the watchmen or embeds it in
the sidechain.

•

Transfer: When the watchmen produce a transaction to execute transfers from the
sidechain to Bitcoin, they ensure that every output of the transaction either 1) is owned by
them or 2) has an authorization proof associated to its address.
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4.2.5.4

Asset transfers on the RSK Platform

Asset transfers on RSK take place with federated two-way pegs. When Bitcoins are transferred
from the Bitcoin blockchain to the RSK sidechain they are referred to as “SmartBitcoins” (SBTC)
(S. D. Lerner, 2015). Hence, SmartBitcoins are Bitcoins living natively on the RSK platform, they
can be transferred back to the Bitcoin blockchain at any given time for a standard RSK transaction
fee.
The federation that controls the asset transfers on RSK comprises of well-known and
community respected members/entities. Each entity of the federation is identified by a public key
for the checkpoint signature scheme. An entity can be added or removed from the federation by
means of an embedded predefined voting system. The addition/removal of an entity from the
federation requires a high majority of votes.
The RSK platform aims to maximize the incentives for merged-mining. However, RSK is
not completely dependent on merged-mining as it is robust to merge-mining shortages. In case of
such situations, the federation automatically takes charge of the RSK network to keep it secure.

4.2.6

RQ3c: What consensus mechanism do these platforms utilize?

We now discuss the consensus mechanisms utilized by the platforms discussed in RQ3 to answer
this research question:
4.2.6.1

Loom Consensus Mechanism

Loom allows for any consensus mechanism to be implemented on a personalized DApp chain,
although the Loom SDK provides support for DPoS on a shared sidechain. In Delegated Proof of
Stake, witnesses are elected who propose blocks and verify transactions. These witnesses serve a
fixed term before elections take place again. Each voter is required to register with the account’s
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public address and the power of each vote is proportional to the number of tokens that account
holds. Accounts are permitted in DPoS to proxy their votes to trusted third parties who vote with
power proportional to proxy balance + sum (balance of principles).

4.2.6.2

POA Consensus Mechanism

The POA network takes advantage of Proof of Authority consensus mechanism. The validators
make all of the governance decisions through exclusive Distributed Applications. US public
notaries serve as the validators on the network. The validators must be publicly known individuals
whose participation can be easily reviewed adding a layer known as an Identity at Stake model 30.
The POA network rewards validators based on the amount staked. Currently, there are a total of 23
validators throughout the United States.

4.2.6.3

Liquid Consensus Mechanism

Dilley et al. (Dilley et al., 2016) recognized both, the latency issues with using a Proof-of-work
consensus mechanism and using a centralized system. Inspired by that, the authors decided to
implement Liquid in a manner that would allow users to transfer assets between blockchains by
providing explicit Proof-of-Possession (PoP) within transactions. Building up on the idea of
federated two-way peg design introduced by Back et al (Back et al., 2014), the authors have
introduced the concept of Strong Federations (Dilley et al., 2016). Strong Federations are made up
of two types of independent entities, namely:
•

Block-signers: maintain the blockchain consensus and to advance the sidechain. They sign
transaction blocks on the sidechain.

30

https://blockonomi.com/proof-of-authority/
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•

Watchmen: are responsible for transferring assets from the sidechain to the mainchain by
signing transactions on the mainchain. Thus, they are only required to be online when
assets are beings transferred between the blockchain.
In a Strong Federation, entities that form the federation cannot directly control a user’s

assets on the system other than their own. In such systems, just the knowledge of a private key is
enough to practice the right to spend and hence, no intervention of a third party is required. Strong
federations also have a mechanism that allows settlements to be transferred back to the mainchain
in case of a federation failure.
Liquid replaces dynamic miner (such as in Bitcoin) with a fixed signer set for a federation
to have low latency and eliminate the risk of reorganization from a given hostile minority. It
implements a validation of a script (which can be static or can change subject to fixed rules) instead
of a Proof-of-Work consensus protocol similar to private chains (Friedenbach & Timón, 2013). In
federated two-way pegged chains, as discussed in RQ1, the script implements a ‘n’ of ‘m’ multisignature scheme which requires each block to be signed by a predetermined number of
signers/entities (for instance ‘n’ of ‘m’ signers/entities). As a result, this mechanism can achieve
Bitcoin like Byzantine robustness as a minority of malicious entities would not be able to affect the
system. Figure 8 depicts how the consensus is achieved on the Liquid platform.
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Figure 17: Block-signing by entities on the Liquid platform

Figure 17 can be summarized in the following steps:
•

Entities propose candidate blocks in a round-robin fashion to all other signing participants.

•

Each entity signals its intent by pre-committing to sign the given candidate block.

•

If threshold X is met, each entity signs the block.

•

If threshold Y (which may be different from X) is met, the block is accepted and sent to
the network.

•

The next block is then proposed by the next entity in the round-robin.
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In Bitcoin, there is a tendency for chain reorganization in the newly added blocks due to
the probabilistic generation of blocks (Eyal & Sirer, 2018). Since block generation in case of strong
federations are based on a fixed set of block signers instead of being probabilistic, Liquid chain
never reorganizes. This allows significantly faster transaction confirmation times than Bitcoin.

4.2.6.4

RSK Consensus Mechanism

While mining on the Bitcoin blockchain, conflicting situations may arise when multiple miners
solve a block at the same chain height. In such situations, it becomes hard to decide which miner’s
block to select and add to the network. Additionally, miners are often required to stop mid-state
and restart mining on new blocks each time a new block is solved and added to the network. These
situations result in poor mining efficiency, greater network latencies, and mining time gaps.
To mitigate this RSK utilizes DECOR+ (S. D. Lerner, 2015) protocol, a reward sharing
scheme which reduces competition while mining providing miners with the option to switch to the
newest block later. With DECOR+ conflicts are resolved deterministically when all nodes have the
same blockchain state information, the resolution is chosen in such a way that it maximizes the
revenue for all miners involved whether they were involved in the conflict or not. The protocol has
the following main features:
•

If a miner switches each time a new block is accepted to the RSK network, they compete
for a full block reward.

•

If a miner switches late i.e. they keep mining older blocks, they create uncles 31 and earn a
share of the block reward.

31

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/uncle-block-cryptocurrency.asp
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In neither of these situation blocks are fully orphaned 32, as the DECOR+ protocol pays a
reward to uncles, which are counted as normal blocks (GHOST protocol (Sompolinsky & Zohar,
2016)). This greatly increases the efficiency of mining on RSK.
When the RSK hashing power is below 50% of the total Bitcoin hashing power, the
network could be vulnerable to 51% attacks and double spending problems. To prevent such
situations, RSK utilizes federated checkpoints, which are signed by federation entities and can be
used by a client to decide which is the best block with the help of multi-signature majority.
Moreover, if the total RSK hashing power goes below 5% of the total Bitcoin hashing power, the
federation would be able to create signed blocks. Finally, the clients stop using federated
checkpoints by defaults if the total RSK hashing power is over 66% of the Bitcoin hashing power
and the paid fees in a block is higher than or equal to the average reward of a Bitcoin block.

4.2.7

RQ3d: How do these platforms impact the scalability of their mainchain?

Table 5 provides a comparison of Ethereum, Loom network and the POA network based on average
block confirmation time, transaction rate, smart contract execution capability, security guarantee
and if the transactions are confidential.
As it can be seen form Table 5, the similarities between the mainchain i.e. Ethereum and
its sidechain are that all the platform support smart contract execution and none of them support
private transactions. The table also shows that the loom network has the fastest block confirmation
times and supports a high rate of transactions.

32

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/orphan-block-cryptocurrency.asp
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Table 5: Comparison of Ethereum, Loom, and the POA network

Features

Average block
confirmation time
Transactions rate
Turing complete
Smart contract
execution
Security guarantee
Confidential
transactions

Ethereum33
(mainchain)

Loom34
(sidechain)

POA network35
(sidechain)

~ 15 seconds

~1 second

~ 5 seconds

~ 15 transactions/sec

>> 1 transaction / sec

~ 60 transaction / sec

Yes

Yes

Yes

Staking

Validators + Voters

Validators

No

No

No

Table 6 summarizes the key differences between Bitcoin, Liquid and RSK based on average block
confirmation time, transaction rate, smart contract execution capability, security guarantee and if
the transactions are confidential.

Table 6: Comparison of Bitcoin, RSK and Liquid

33

Features

Bitcoin
(mainchain)

Liquid36
(sidechain)

RSK37
(sidechain)

Average block
confirmation time

~ 10 minutes

~ 1 minute

~ 30 seconds

Transactions rate

~7
transactions/second

>> 1
transaction/second

300 – 1000
transactions/second

Turing complete
Smart contract
execution

No

No

Yes

Security guarantee

SHA256D miners

Strong federation

SHA256D merger
miners + federation

Confidential
transactions

No

Yes

Planned for future

https://etherscan.io/
https://blockexplorer.loomx.io
35 https://blockscout.com/poa/core/
36 https://blockstream.com/liquid/
37 https://stats.rsk.co/
34
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It is clear from Table 6 that only RSK supports the execution of smart contracts. It also has the
fastest block confirmation times and highest transaction rates compared to the Bitcoin (mainchain)
blockchain or the Liquid network.

4.2.8

RQ3e: What are the limitations of these platforms?

To answer this research question and to conclude the set of research questions discussing second
layer scaling solution, we now discuss some of the limitations of state-of-the-art platforms
discussed in RQ3.

4.2.8.1

Limitations of Loom

Some of the limitations of the Loom network are as follows:
•

The entire transaction history of the sidechain is stored on the Ethereum mainchain instead
of the sidechain itself decreasing the data integrity of the sidechain. The Merkle roots of
the entire transaction history of the sidechain is periodically updated on the mainchain
leaving open opportunities for an attack in between updates of the sidechain’s transaction
history (Bharel, 2019).

•

To further increase the reliability on the mainchain, the security guarantees of the Loom
network hinge on the ability to transfer tokens back to the mainchain. If the tokens are not
approved for transfer back to the mainchain, the tokens can be at risk of being
compromised. Loom’s security is based on the mainchain being the target of an attack and
not the sidechain a game is running on. There is more incentive in putting forth the
resources to take over the Ethereum mainchain then a DApp supporting a decentralized
game. Loom uses Plasma to securely transfer tokens back to the mainchain without needing
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to trust the consensus algorithm on the sidechain. In a plasma exit, this is where a Merkle
proof needs to be presented and can be challenged and the exit can fail.
•

Another limitation of the Loom network is being restricted to OS X and Linux operating
systems. The closest support for Windows is the Windows subsystem for Linux. Also,
Loom’s transfer gateway functionality can hurt the performance of the transfer of tokens
between the two blockchains. The transfer gateway depends on an active presence on the
Loom network and if there is not one, the transfer of tokens will be delayed.

•

Loom network is based on federated two-way pegs, which introduce centralization in its
blockchain-sidechain ecosystem as discussed in RQ1.

4.2.8.2

Limitations of POA

Some of the limitations of the POA network are as follows:
•

POA network suffers from the problem of centralization due to the power that the 23
validators hold. The governance of the network is entirely determined by these validators.
These validators reside solely in the United States and are public notaries of the United
States. They are chosen by individual qualities such as public reputation, personal
knowledge, and experience. They also need to be diverse geographically within the United
States, so validators come from different states. One of the restrictions on adding to the
number of validators is finding potential validators that meet the needed qualifications.

•

Since all the validators of the POA network are based in the United States, this introduces
geographical centralization element in the network. This type of model is undesirable as
the validators may choose to censor information from other regions or countries.
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•

The POA Network plans on an increase in validators but there is worry that an increase in
the number of validators will impede the performance of the network as it would take a
longer time for block-signatures and hence, transaction confirmations.

4.2.8.3

Limitations of Liquid

Some of the limitations of the Liquid platform are as follows:
•

Currently, only members of the Liquid network can run full nodes. Although the developers
plan to allow other users to run full nodes to validate the network, it is not feasible at its
current state.

•

Liquid nodes require more computing resources than Bitcoin as the platform requires a
Bitcoin node alongside the Liquid node to be able to validate asset transfers.

•

The liquid network uses federated two-way pegs which introduces political centralization
in the sidechain ecosystem.

4.2.8.4

Limitations of RSK

Some of the limitations of the RSK platforms are as follows:
•

Currently, the RSK main-net is not available to all developers. The platform currently
employs a whitelisting process where a development team/company is required to have a
fully functional/semi-functional project approved by RSK to gain access to the network for
testing and deployment on the platform. The whitelisting process can take a minimum of 3
days for approval. The platform aims to open the network for all users once the first stage
of the bounty hunting program is completed.

•

The use of federated two-way pegs introduces political centralization in the sidechain
ecosystem as discussed in RQ1.
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4.2.8.5

Comparison of Sidechain Platforms

Table 7 provides a comparative summary of Loom, the POA Network, Liquid and RSK platforms
based on possible use cases, consensus mechanism, two-way peg design and limitations. The table
also highlights the advantages that these platforms provide over their parent chains.
Table 7: Comparison of sidechain platforms
Platform

Use Cases

Consensus
Mechanism

Two-way
peg
design

Advantages
over
mainchain

Loom

DelegateCal
l, Game
developmen
t, scalable
DApps

Delegated
Proof-ofStake
(DPoS)/any
consensus
mechanism

Federate
d twoway peg

Scalability,
Efficiency
needed for
games

POA

Scalable
smart
contracts

Proof-ofAuthority

Federate
d twoway peg

Interoperabi
lity between
blockchains

Liquid

International
Exchange

Proof-ofPossession

Federate
d twoway peg

Faster
transaction
rates than
Bitcoin

RSK

Retail
Payment
Systems,
Supply
Chain
Traceability,
Digital
Identity

Proof-ofwork based
mergedmining
with
Bitcoin,
DECOR+

Federate
d twoway peg

Ability to
execute
smart
contracts

Limitations

1. limited Windows (OS)
support
2. If the tokens are not
approved for transfer back to
the mainchain, the tokens can
be at risk of being compromised
3. The Loom Network runs on
the idea that it is not necessary
to store every transaction on the
sidechain
4. Centralization due to
federated two-way peg
1. Centralization due to
federated two-way peg.
2. geographically centralized
which may introduce
censorship
3. Plans to increase the number
of validators which could
impede performance.
1. Currently not open to all
users
2. Running Liquid full nodes
requires more resources than
running Bitcoin full nodes
3. Centralization due to
federated two-way peg

1. Currently not open to all
users/developers
2. Centralization due to
federated two-way peg
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An interesting observation from Table 7 suggests that all the four platforms discussed in this section
use federated two-way pegs. This is because in its current state it is not possible to implement SPV
based two-way pegs in Bitcoin, due to missing opcodes from its protocol (See Chapter 5 – subsection 5.2.3). Whereas, when it comes to the Ethereum based sidechain platforms, the Loom
network intends to implement a more robust, secure and decentralized two-way peg design in the
future and finally, the POA network’s decision to implement a federated two-way peg was based
on the idea of preservation of a human element in a blockchain ecosystem.

4.3

Other projects and frameworks

There are other innovative sidechain projects and frameworks that slightly fell short of our criteria
for selection. The reasons why these projects were not selected were because of incomplete and/or
active development, technical difficulties and lack of thorough documentation and support.
Plasma is a framework proposed by Buterin and Poon (Buterin & Poon, n.d.), which may
have the potential to provide highly scalable solutions for the blockchain-based decentralized
financial industry as it incentivizes and enforces the execution of smart contracts. The platform is
potentially aiming to achieve more than a billion state updates per second. The smart contracts
running on the platform are incentivized to continue operation autonomously with the help of
network transaction fees. This process ultimately relies on the underlying blockchain (for instance,
Ethereum) to enforce transactional state transitions.
The Elements project (BlockStream, n.d.) was launched in June 2015. It is an open-source,
blockchain platform which is also sidechain-capable. It provides features such as Issued assets and
confidential transactions. Blockchains developed with the Elements platform can be configured
and developed to either run as standalone blockchains or as pegged sidechains to other blockchains
which allow assets to be transferred between disparate blockchains. It utilizes and extends the
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current Bitcoin codebase; hence, it allows developers to take advantage of the bitcoind 38
Application Programming Interface (API) to develop blockchains and test proof-of-concept
projects. Since Elements is built upon the Bitcoin’s codebase, it can also serve as a test-net for
introducing changes to the Bitcoin protocol.
In the context of the Elements platform, a sidechain is an extension to an existing
blockchain. Assets are transferable between chains allowing the main chain to benefit from the
enhanced features of the sidechain, such as rapid transfer finality and confidential transactions.
While a sidechain is aware of the main chain and its transaction history, the main chain has no
awareness of the sidechain, and none is required for its operation. This enables sidechains to
innovate without restriction or the delays associated with main chain protocol improvement
proposals. Indeed, rather than trying to alter it directly, extending the main protocol with a sidechain
allows the main chain itself to remain secure and specialized, underpinning the smooth operation
of the sidechain.

38

https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-reference#serialized-blocks
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Chapter 5.

Open Issues and Future Directions

Both first- and second-layer scaling solutions are innovative approaches for improving the
scalability of public and permissionless blockchains. But based on our research, they require
extensive further research for the advancement of the blockchain domain, this is because in their
current state these solutions face multiple issues which need to be addressed. In this chapter, we
will discuss some of the major issues surrounding the proposed first- and second-layer scaling
solutions and then, we will propose initial steps that could be taken to address or mitigate these
issues.

5.1

First-layer scaling solutions

First-layer scaling such as segregated witness and sharding face multiple implementation threats
and challenges such as threats of a hard fork, miner incentivization, extreme physical resource
requirement, etc. In this section, we will discuss some of the issues that the blockchain community
faces when it comes to implementing first-layer scaling solutions.

5.1.1

Data Validation in Sharding

Consider Figure 18 on which Shard 1 is corrupted and a malicious actor produces invalid block B.
Suppose in this block B 1000 tokens were minted out of thin air on Alice’s account. The malicious
actor then produces valid block C (in a sense that the transactions in C are applied correctly) on top
of B, obfuscating the invalid block B, and initiates a cross-shard transaction to Shard 2 that transfers
those 1000 tokens to Bob’s account. From this moment the improperly created tokens reside on an
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otherwise completely valid blockchain in Shard 2. A few simple approaches to tackle this issue
could be:

Figure 18: Data validation problem in sharding

•

For validators of Shard 2 to validate the block from which the transaction is initiated. This
won’t work even in the example above since block C appears to be completely valid.

•

For validators in Shard 2 to validate some large number of blocks preceding the block from
which the transaction is initiated. Naturally, for any number of blocks N validated by the
receiving shard, the malicious validators can create N+1 valid blocks on top of the invalid
block they produced (Skidanov, 2018c).
A promising idea to resolve this issue would be to arrange shards into an undirected graph

in which each shard is connected to several other shards and only allow cross-shard transactions
between neighboring shards (Skidanov, 2018c). If a cross-shard transaction is needed between
shards that are not neighbors, such transaction is routed through multiple shards (Skidanov, 2018a),
(Martino, Quaintance, & Popejoy, n.d.). In this design, a validator in each shard is expected to
validate both all the blocks in their shard as well as all the blocks in all the neighboring shards.
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Consider Figure 19 below with 10 shards, each having four neighbors, and no two shards requiring
more than two hops for a cross-shard communication:

Figure 19: Cross-shard transactions amongst neighboring shards

Shard 2 is not only validating its own blockchain, but also blockchains of all the neighbors,
including Shard 1. So, if a malicious actor on Shard 1 is attempting to create an invalid block B,
then build block C on top of it and initiate a cross-shard transaction, such cross-shard transaction
will not go through since Shard 2 will have validated the entire history of Shard 1 which will cause
it to identify invalid block B.
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Figure 20: An adversary executing cross-shard transaction

While corrupting a single shard is no longer a viable attack, corrupting a few shards remains a
problem. Figure 20 shows an adversary corrupting both Shard 1 and Shard 2 successfully executes
a cross-shard transaction to Shard 3 with funds from an invalid block B: Shard 3 validates all the
blocks in Shard 2, but not in Shard 1, and has no way to detect the malicious block.

Figure 21: A possible approach for data validation
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The idea behind solving the data validation problem in blockchain sharding is shown in Figure 21:
whenever a block header is communicating between chains for any purpose (such as cross-linking
to the beacon chain, or a cross-shard transaction), there’d a period during which any honest
validator can provide a proof that the block is invalid.
There are various constructions that enable very succinct proofs that the blocks are invalid,
so the communication overhead for the receiving nodes is much smaller than that of receiving a
full block. With this approach for as long as there’s at least one honest validator in the shard, the
system would be secure.

5.1.2

A threat of hard forks

We have emphasized a major problem with the implementation of first-layer scaling solutions on
public and permissionless blockchains (Chapter 3 - RQ3) i.e. the agreement within the miners
regrading a specific change in the protocol of the blockchain. There will often be times when a
proposed change in protocol for a blockchain will not be agreed upon by the majority of the miners
of the blockchain network. This leads to a difficult situation in which forcing a change in the
protocol of the blockchain is likely to cause a hard fork of the network as can be seen in the case
of Bitcoin forking into Bitcoin Cash. Thus, this makes public and permissionless blockchains such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum extremely stringent and deterrent to change, even when the change is for
the overall improvement of the blockchain network. This aspect of a public blockchain is a major
limitation and a huge stumbling block in the implementation of first-layer scaling solutions.
Often times lack of proper communication amongst the miners of a blockchain regarding
a proposed change in protocol might also result in change resistance. Although there are protocols
available for proposing changes to the Ethereum and Bitcoin protocol such as, Ethereum
Improvement Proposals (EIP) (Ethereum, n.d.) and Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIP) (Bitcoin,

82
2011), these proposals are hardly ever advertised to the blockchain community especially the
miners of these networks (Khatwani, 2017). Hence, we suggest a lightweight broadcasting and
voting system for clearly describing and advertising the proposed changes, their advantages and
limitations to the miners of a blockchain network. The system can then be used for conducting polls
within the miners on whether a change in the protocol should be implemented or not. This would
be an effective way of conveying or advertising a change in protocol for a public blockchain
amongst its miners instead of directly forcing a change which may result in a hard-fork or just
waiting and hoping that the miners will reach an agreement regarding the change at some point in
the future.

5.2

Second-layer scaling solutions

Sidechains are still relatively new proposals and are by no means mature enough to change the
blockchain world at this time, but they sure are promising for the future of the blockchain industry.
In this section, we discuss the most important open issues in the infant sidechain domain and
suggest future measures and recommendations for the mitigation or elimination of these issues.

5.2.1

Centralization in federated two-way pegs

Political decentralization is an important characteristic of a blockchain network, as discussed in
Chapter 4 – RQ1, federated two-way pegs introduce a level of political centralization in the
sidechain ecosystem. Hence, it is important to identify and select honest and trusted entities to form
a federation for the security and integrity of a network. It is extremely critical that entities have
their economic interests well aligned with the proper functioning of a federation. It would obviously
be a mistake to rely on a random assortment of volunteers to support a commercial sidechain
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holding significant value. Beyond the incentive (R M Parizi & Dehghantanha, 2018) to attempt to
extract any value contained on the sidechain, these volunteers would also have little incentive to
ensure the reliability of the network. To mitigate these concerns, we propose a federation should at
least have the following attributes which may potentially lead to good results:
•

Federations are most secure when each entity has a similar amount of value held by the
federation. Incentives can be aligned using escrow, entity allocation, or external legal
constructs such as insurance policies and surety bonds

•

The total number of entities that form a federation should lie in the range - [15, 30]. This
is to maintain political decentralization and still provide the users with the ability to verify
the authenticity of each entity within the federation in a relatively short period of time.

•

The identity and authenticity of each entity should be verifiable. Some ways to achieve this
could be providing proof of identity with government issued ID’s or licenses, proof of
physical address, etc.

•

Entities should be distributed geographically to prevent down-time in case of power failure,
natural disasters, etc.

•

Entities should be disparate from one another and should not engage in business with one
another, this would eliminate conflict of interest and censorship.

5.2.2

Security of Federated two-way pegs

Federated two-way pegs introduce a security risk in the sidechain ecosystem. For instance, if the
private keys of the majority of the network are compromised, then the assets locked in the lockbox
(or on the sidechain) are vulnerable to theft. This is because as discussed in Chapter 4 – RQ1, a
transaction in a federated two-way peg design requires ‘n’ of ‘m’ signatures to be approved (where
‘n’ is the majority in a total of ‘m’ entities). One way to mitigate this threat would be to migrate to
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SPV based two-way peg design where the lockbox is usually controlled by the miners of the
network and the only way to unlock the funds from the lockbox is to provide a valid SPV proof.

5.2.3

SPV based two-way pegs on Bitcoin

SPV proofs can provide a solution to the political centralization issue with federated two-way pegs.
As discussed in Chapter 4 – RQ1, SPV proofs require no single entity or a group of entities
(Federation), for transferring assets from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice versa.
Unfortunately, SPV based two-pegs cannot be implemented on a sidechain pegged to the Bitcoin
blockchain at this time. This is because in its current state Bitcoin is missing a few opcodes from
its protocol such as:
•

OP_WITHDRAWPROOFVERIFY: OP_WITHDRAWPROOFVERIFY would unlock
‘reserve’ coins on a sidechain. A user would need to provide inputs to an output such that
the output would evaluate to true - which would unlock the reserve coins. The user would
then be credited on the sidechain with the amount of coins they locked up on the Bitcoin
blockchain. The change on the sidechain would also be sent back to the federation’s reserve
address (Stewert, 2017).

•

OP_REORGPROOFVERIFY: OP_REORGPROOFVERIFY would allow users to
submit SPV proofs in the reorg-period (Chapter 4 – RQ1). This opcode would correct
invalid states of two types: 1) double spends (Bala & Manoharan, 2018), (Bae & Lim,
2018) of a parent chain lock and 2) parent chain reorganizations (Elements, 2016).
We propose the addition of these opcodes to the Bitcoin protocol in the future. This would

allow the community to implement sidechain technology with SPV based two-way pegs instead of
relying on federated two-way pegs.
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5.2.4

Lack of research support on current sidechain platforms

The sidechain domain is still relatively new and hence, most state-of-the-art sidechain platforms
are still in development or bounty hunting phases. Based on the authors’ experimental experiences,
registering or submitting DApps on some the platforms (e.g. Liquid and RSK) discussed in the
previous chapter is extremely difficult and selective as the developers do not provide access to all
users on their platforms at this time. To make matters worse some of these platforms are not
integrated to the Bitcoin or Ethereum test-nets at this time (e.g. Liquid). This makes performing
empirical studies by researchers or practitioners on these platforms extremely difficult and
expensive due to the market value of Bitcoin and Ether cryptocurrencies. Empirical research is an
important tool in software engineering (Malhotra, 2015) which can reveal hidden trends, patterns,
anomalies and limitations of a software system (Reza M Parizi, Dehghantanha, Choo, & Singh,
2018). Hence, we strongly advocate the integration of these platforms to their parent chain’s testnets. This would allow the researchers in the community to analyze and evaluate these platforms
based on several attributes such as performance, security, and privacy which would help in
speeding-up development process and the overall advancement of sidechain technology.
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Chapter 6.

Conclusions

In the last decade, blockchain technology has grown exponentially with seemingly new use cases
being discovered almost every day. Consequently, research in the domain has picked up pace in
recent years both to discover issues and vulnerabilities in blockchains and to provide solutions to
these problems and challenges. Scalability and limited functionality have shackled blockchains
ever since its proposal and implementation in 2008. In response to this, the community has
proposed first- and second-layer scaling solutions.
First layer scaling solutions require changes in the codebase of existing blockchains. We
have discussed two of the most common first layer scaling solutions i.e. Segregated witness and
sharding. Second layer scaling solutions do not require changes to existing blockchain codebase,
instead, these solutions propose an implementation of a second layer on top of existing blockchains,
for instance, sidechains.
Although these solutions are promising, a comprehensive study is still lacking in the
literature to study the impact of scaling solutions on the scalability of public blockchains such as
Bitcoin and Ethereum. Moreover, there has been a lack of studies discussion on how and where
these solutions can be effectively integrated into blockchains to remedy current issues in a clear
context. Hence, the motivation of our study was to take the first step and provide a comprehensive
review of 1) the available design choices for the first layer scaling solutions for public blockchains,
and 2) state-of-the-art sidechain platforms based on their use cases, consensus mechanisms, asset
transfer protocols, and limitations. This thesis also identifies current advancements, analyzes their
impact from various viewpoints and proposes directions for the future of research and development,
Moreover, we have discussed general open issues that need well-deserved attention from the
community for the advancement of the overall blockchain domain.
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